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Administrative Law
by Alan Gregory Poole, Jr.
and Chelsea M. Lamb**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2018 through May 31, 2019, in
which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case.1
Exhaustion of administrative remedies will be the first topic discussed,
followed by a review of decisions by administrative agencies, followed by
cases discussing the administrative scope of authority, with statutory
construction to follow. The Article will conclude with cases discussing
the standard of review of decisions by administrative agencies.
II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
In Georgia Department of Human Services v. Addison,2 the Georgia
Supreme Court held that teachers and administrators were required to
exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing any
as-applied constitutional challenges to Georgia’s child abuse registry
statute and administrative rules.3 The plaintiffs, a group of high school
teachers and administrators who worked with special education
students at Albany High School, were accused of child neglect for failing
to provide adequate supervision after two incidents of alleged sexual
abuse between students. The claims were investigated by the Division
of Family and Children Services (DFCS), which found the allegations to

Associate, Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Institute of Technology
(B.S., 2009); University of Georgia (J.D., 2013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Associate, Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.A.,
2010); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2015). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of administrative law during the prior survey period, see Jennifer
B. Alewine, Alan Gregory Poole, Jr., Chelsea M. Lamb & Emily R. Wright, Administrative
Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 1 (2018).
2. 304 Ga. 425, 819 S.E.2d 20 (2018).
3. Id. at 432, 819 S.E.2d at 26.
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be “substantiated.”4 DFCS informed the plaintiffs through notices that
they had a right to an administrative hearing in accordance with
section 49-5-183(a)5 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.).6 Though the administrative process was still pending, the
plaintiffs’ names were added to the Georgia Child Abuse Registry, 7 and
the plaintiffs filed suit in the Dougherty County Superior Court
requesting a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the
defendants.8 The superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding
that “the Registry statutes violate due process because alleged child
abusers [were] not given an opportunity to be heard before being added
to the Registry; the notices . . . were insufficient” because they were
insufficiently specific about the abuse, and “the definition of
‘substantiated case’ in OCGA § 49-5-180 [was] vague.”9 As a result, the
superior court declared O.C.G.A. §§ 49-5-180 through 49-5-18710
“unconstitutional ‘on their face and as applied to’ the plaintiffs.” 11 The
defendants filed a notice of appeal, arguing in part that the plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their “administrative remedies before seeking judicial
review of their claims.”12
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that they “were not required to
exhaust their available administrative remedies because their
constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes are entirely facial
rather than as-applied.”13 The court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding
that under Georgia law facial challenges do not require exhaustion of
administrative remedies.14 The court also held, however, that as-applied
challenges do require exhaustion of administrative remedies. 15 As such,
the trial court should have dismissed the as-applied challenge because
the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by

4. Id. at 426, 819 S.E.2d at 22.
5. O.C.G.A. § 49-5-183(a) (2019).
6. Addison, 304 Ga. at 426, 819 S.E.2d at 22.
7. Id. at 426, 819 S.E.2d at 22.
8. Id. at 428, 819 S.E.2d at 24.
9. Id. at 429, 819 S.E.2d at 24.
10. O.C.G.A. §§ 49-5-180–49-5-187 (2019).
11. Addison, 304 Ga. at 429, 819 S.E.2d at 25.
12. Id. at 431, 819 S.E.2d at 26.
13. Id. at 432, 819 S.E.2d at 26.
14. Id. (citing Women’s Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Berry, 302 Ga. 349, 351, 806 S.E.2d 606,
608 (2017) (stating that no exhaustion requirement exists when a plaintiff challenges a
statute’s constitutionality on its face)).
15. Id.
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filing the action during the pendency of the related administrative
proceeding.16
In C&M Enterprises of Georgia, LLC v. Williams,17 the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s appeal was “not barred by a failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.”18 In March 2016, Mark Williams,
the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources,
determined that a portion of riverfront property in Bryan County was
illegally located in a protected estuarine area. 19 Williams directed the
structure’s owner, C&M Enterprises of Georgia, LLC, to remove the
structure, which C&M appealed to an administrative law court 20
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-5-283.21 The Administrative Law Judge
(A.L.J.) granted Williams’ motion for summary judgment, and the
Fulton County Superior Court affirmed.22
On appeal, Commissioner Williams argued that because C&M failed
to appeal a related cease and desist order in 2010 (which sparked the
eventual determination of the Department of Natural Resources in
2016) that C&M failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.23 The
Georgia Court of Appeals agreed that there is a “[l]ong-standing
Georgia law [that] requires that a party aggrieved by a state agency’s
decision must raise all issues before that agency and exhaust available
administrative remedies before seeking any judicial review of the
agency’s decision.”24 The court, however, ultimately concluded that the
2010 cease and desist letter was only a preliminary occurrence in a
greater proceeding that resulted in a final administrative ruling in
2016, which C&M properly appealed.25
Next, in Carson v. Brown,26 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
the “release” of a permit application back to an applicant during a

16. Id.
17. 346 Ga. App. 79, 816 S.E.2d 44 (2018).
18. Id. at 86, 816 S.E.2d at 50.
19. Id. at 79, 816 S.E.2d at 46. As a note, “estuarine areas” are usually found where a
river meets the ocean, most notably having the feature of brackish water (water that is
partially fresh and partially salt). See National Estuarine Research Reserves, NOAA
OFFICE FOR COASTAL MANAGEMENT https://coast.noaa.gov/nerrs/ (last visited Nov. 1,
2019).
20. C&M Enters. of Ga., 346 Ga. App. at 79, 816 S.E.2d at 46.
21. O.C.G.A. § 12-5-283(b) (2019).
22. C&M Enters. of Ga., 346 Ga. App. at 80, 816 S.E.2d at 47.
23. Id. at 84–85, 816 S.E.2d at 49–50.
24. Id. at 85, 816 S.E.2d at 50 (quoting Ga. Dept. of Cmty. Health v. Ga. Soc’y of
Ambulatory Surgery Ctrs., 290 Ga. 628, 629, 724 S.E.2d 386, 389 (2012)).
25. Id.
26. 348 Ga. App. 689, 824 S.E.2d 605 (2019).
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permit moratorium is not a decision on the permit application, and
therefore the permit application was not “rejected” for the purpose of
triggering the administrative process of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34.27 The
plaintiffs, Carson and Red Bull Holdings II, LLC (collectively Carson),
filed for construction permits with the Forsyth County Department of
Planning and Community Development (the Department). 28 The
Department returned the permits back to Carson, stating that the
permits were “released” due to a county-imposed moratorium, but did
not expressly reject the permits. 29 Carson filed a mandamus petition
seeking to “compel Brown and Williams”—Tom Brown, the director of
the Department, and Carroll Williams, the planner of the
Department—“to process his application for a land-disturbance permit
submitted in anticipation of developing certain real property in Forsyth
County.”30 The trial court granted Carson a partial motion for judgment
on the pleadings against Brown and Williams. One of the issues in
question was whether the trial court should have dismissed the action
due to the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.31
Brown and Williams claimed that the trial court had erred in not
rejecting the application for failure to appeal the application’s rejection
as required by the County’s Unified Development Code. 32 The court of
appeals determined, however, that the trial court did not err in failing
to dismiss for this reason as the defendants contended.33 In so
determining, the court noted that there was no decision made on the
permit application, and therefore, the plaintiffs could not appeal the
permit’s “rejection” as would otherwise be required by the statute.34 The
County’s “release” of the permit application was not a decision, nor was
the County’s letter an “independent rejection of the application.” 35
Therefore, Carson’s action was not barred due to a theory of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.36

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34 (2019); Carson, 348 Ga. App. at 710, 824 S.E.2d at 621.
Carson, 348 Ga. App. at 693, 824 S.E.2d at 610.
Id. at 700–01, 824 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 689–90, 824 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 690, 824 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 710, 824 S.E.2d at 621.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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III. REVIEW OF DECISIONS MADE BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
In Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers,
LLC,37 the Georgia Court of Appeals remanded a case concerning water
quality standards back to the deciding A.L.J. due to the use of an
incorrect legal standard.38 Altamaha Riverkeeper (Riverkeeper)
petitioned the Georgia Court of Appeals to review the Wayne County
Superior Court’s reversal of the refusal to issue a permit by an A.L.J.
The permit was initially issued by the Environmental Protection
Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, and
the A.L.J. reversed the issuance. 39 In deciding to reverse, the A.L.J.
“interpreted the phrase ‘interfere[nce] with legitimate water uses’” 40
from the Georgia Water Quality Control Act (WQCA)41 “to mean ‘any
interference’ with such uses,” concluding that this standard applied to
all waterways for all uses without exception. 42 Further, the A.L.J.
concluded that “to show interference with legitimate water uses, the
‘use of the river [must be] actually hindered or disrupted.’”43 Finding
this standard unmet, the A.L.J. overturned the issuance of the permit
by the EPD. On review, the Wayne County Superior Court found that
the A.L.J. erred in interpreting the standard in the WCQA, concluding
instead that the EPD’s interpretation of the standard as one of
“unreasonable interference” was correct, and reversed the decision of
the A.L.J.44
In deciding this issue, the court of appeals read the text of the
standard “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary
speaker of the English language would.”45 To assist with that reading,
the court considered the common and customary usage of the word, the
context of the word, and dictionary definitions. 46 Given an analysis of
these sources, the court of appeals held that the EPD could reasonably
conclude that the standard “does not require that ‘all people get to use
all sections of every waterbody at all times.’” 47 Accordingly, the court of

37. 346 Ga. App. 269, 816 S.E.2d 125 (2018).
38. Id. at 276, 816 S.E.2d at 131.
39. Id. at 269, 816 S.E.2d at 127.
40. Id. at 270, 816 S.E.2d at 127.
41. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-20–12-5-53 (2019).
42. Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc., 346 Ga. App. at 270, 816 S.E.2d at 127.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 270–71, 816 S.E.2d at 128.
45. Id. at 272, 816 S.E.2d at 128 (quoting Tibbles v. Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga.
557, 558, 775 S.E.2d 527, 529 (2015)).
46. Id. at 272, 816 S.E.2d at 129.
47. Id. at 274, 816 S.E.2d at 130.

[1] ADMIN - BP (DO NOT DELETE)

6

MERCER LAW REVIEW

11/26/2019 10:53 AM

[Vol. 71

appeals held that the superior court correctly decided that the standard
prohibits “unreasonable” interference congruent with the EPD standard
contrary to the A.L.J. finding.48 However, the court of appeals held that
the proper remedy was for the trial court to remand the case back to the
A.L.J. for a determination based upon the correct legal standard.49
In Grogan v. City of Dawsonville,50 the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff, Grogan, was entitled to a direct appeal from the City
of Dawsonville’s decision to remove Grogan as mayor. 51 The
Dawsonville City Council (City) voted to remove the mayor of the city,
W. James Grogan, from his position, citing “provisions of former
Section 5.16 (1) of the Dawsonville Charter.” 52 Grogan sought review of
the decision by filing an appeal with the Dawson County Superior
Court; the City filed a counterclaim against Grogan for attorney’s fees
and money had and received.53 Grogan then moved to dismiss the City’s
counterclaim pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1,54 Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP
statute.55 The superior court dismissed Grogan’s appeal, holding that
Grogan should have first sought discretionary review, and granted the
City partial summary judgment on its money had and received claim. 56
Grogan appealed this decision directly to the Georgia Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari.57 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that Grogan was not required to appeal via discretionary appeal. 58 In so
holding, the court held that “[i]n denying Grogan’s motion to dismiss . . .
the superior court was not reviewing the decision of an administrative
agency” that would have otherwise required a discretionary appeal. 59
Rather, the dismissal was a determination of whether the City’s
counterclaim violated the Anti-SLAPP statute, not a review of an
administrative body’s decision.60

48. Id. at 275–76, 816 S.E.2d at 131.
49. Id. at 276, 816 S.E.2d at 131.
50. 305 Ga. 79, 823 S.E.2d 763 (2019).
51. Id. at 83, 823 S.E.2d at 767.
52. Id. at 80, 823 S.E.2d at 765.
53. Id. at 79, 823 S.E.2d at 765.
54. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (2019).
55. SLAPPs is shorthand for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” See
What is a SLAPP?, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/what-is-a-slapp
(last visited Oct. 13, 2019).
56. Grogan, 305 Ga. at 79, 823 S.E.2d at 765.
57. Id. at 81, 823 S.E.2d at 766.
58. Id. at 83, 823 S.E.2d at 767.
59. Id. at 83, 823 S.E.2d at 768.
60. Id.
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In Cobb Hospital, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Community Health,61
the Georgia Supreme Court held that a hearing officer of the Certificate
of Need (CON) Appeals Panel does not have the authority to review a
decision by the Georgia Department of Community Health (DCH)
regarding a health care facility’s existing CON. 62 In 2016, Emory
University Hospital Smyrna (EUHS) applied with the DCH for a new
CON to undertake improvements and renovations totaling $33.8
million.63 Other hospitals, such as Cobb Hospital, Kennestone Hospital,
and Wellstar Kennestone Hospital (collectively Wellstar), objected to
the application, “arguing that the application ‘seeks to develop a new
hospital’ rather than reopening and renovating the former
Emory-Adventist Hospital.”64 The DCH granted EUHS’s application,
awarding it a new CON, and Wellstar appealed to the CON Appeals
Panel in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44.65 A panel officer affirmed
the DCH decision on the ground that Wellstar’s appeal concerned the
scope and validity of EUHS’s original CON, and the CON Appeals
Panel lacked the authority to review the determination of the original
CON.66 Wellstar appealed that decision to the DCH commissioner. The
DCH commissioner affirmed the panel officer decision, and Wellstar
appealed to the Superior Court of Cobb County, which denied the
petition for judicial review.67
On appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals, Wellstar argued that the
CON Appeal Panel erroneously concluded that it lacked the authority to
review the status of an existing CON.68 In deciding this issue, the
Georgia Court of Appeals considered the plain language of O.C.G.A.
§ 31-6-44.69 The language of that statutory section is read in light of
Section 274-1-.09 of the Georgia Administrative Code,70 which includes
a mandate that certain issues, such as “‘the correctness . . . of the
considerations, rules, or standards by which the proposed project was
reviewed by the [DCH],’” “‘shall not be considered at an initial

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
888.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

349 Ga. App. 452, 825 S.E.2d 886 (2019).
Id. at 453, 825 S.E.2d at 888.
Id. at 452, 825 S.E.2d at 887–88.
Id. at 453, 825 S.E.2d at 888.
O.C.G.A. § 31-6-44 (2019); Cobb Hosp., Inc., 349 Ga. App. at 453, 825 S.E.2d at
Cobb Hosp., Inc., 349 Ga. App. at 455, 825 S.E.2d at 889.
Id. at 453, 825 S.E.2d at 888.
Id.
Id.
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 274-1-.09 (2019).
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administrative appeal hearing and are immaterial to the hearing.’” 71
Accordingly, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the CON
Appeals Panel can only conduct a de novo review of the decision made
by DCH72 and cannot review the status of an existing CON. 73 The
Georgia Court of Appeals noted that after the de novo review, the
aggrieved party can still “petition the DCH commissioner for review of
the panel hearing officer’s decision,” and can thereafter appeal directly
in superior court.74
IV. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
During this survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the
Georgia Court of Appeals’s decision in Gould v. Housing Authority of
Augusta,75 which was discussed in last year’s Survey.76 In Housing
Authority of Augusta v. Gould77 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
“[i]f a local government exercises a quasi-judicial power,” the acts are
generally “subject to [the] review . . . [of] a superior court,” but where
the local government “exercises . . . only an executive or administrative
power, the writ of certiorari will not lie.” 78 The Georgia Supreme Court
noted that in the majority opinion of the court of appeals, Presiding
Judge McFadden determined that because the underlying decision in
Gould was “quasi-judicial . . . it was within the certiorari jurisdiction of
the superior court.”79 The majority opinion was joined by Judges
Branch, McMillian, and Mercier, and dissented to by then-Judge
Bethel.80 In determining whether certiorari was properly granted, the
Georgia Supreme Court considered the statutory text of O.C.G.A.
§ 5-4-1(a),81 which states that “‘[t]he writ of certiorari [in the superior
court] shall lie for the correction of errors committed by any inferior
judicatory or any person exercising judicial powers . . . .’”82 The court
noted that “[l]ong settled precedents of this Court establish that the
71. Cobb Hosp., Inc., 349 Ga. App. at 458, 825 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting GA. COMP. R. &
REGS. 274-1-.09(2)(a) (2019)) (emphasis omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 461, 825 S.E.2d at 893.
74. Id. at 458, 825 S.E.2d at 891.
75. 343 Ga. App. 761, 808 S.E.2d 109 (2017), rev’d, 305 Ga. 545, 826 S.E.2d 107
(2019).
76. See Alewine, et al., supra note 1, at 9–10.
77. 305 Ga. 545, 826 S.E.2d 107 (2019).
78. Id. at 550–51, 826 S.E.2d at 111.
79. Id. at 549–50, 826 S.E.2d at 110–11.
80. Id. at 550, 826 S.E.2d at 111.
81. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a) (2019).
82. Gould, 305 Ga. at 550, 826 S.E.2d at 111 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a)).
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writ runs not only to judicial proceedings in inferior courts, but also to
quasi-judicial proceedings before agencies of local government.” 83
Importantly, the Georgia Supreme Court laid out three essential
characteristics that qualify an act as quasi-judicial: (1) first, acts to
which “‘all parties are as a matter of right entitled to notice and to a
hearing, with the opportunity afforded to present evidence under
judicial forms of procedure;’”84 (2) second, “a quasi-judicial act is one
that requires a decisional process that is judicial in nature, involving an
ascertainment of the relevant facts from evidence presented and an
application of preexisting legal standards to those facts;” 85 and (3) third,
“a quasi-judicial decision reviewable by writ of certiorari is one that is
final, binding, and conclusive of the rights of the interested parties.” 86
Using this formulation, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the act
of the local government was quasi-judicial and therefore subject to the
review of the superior court. 87 In this case, the Housing Authority of the
City of Augusta (the Authority) terminated Gould’s Section 8 housing
assistance, and gave Gould the right to appeal the decision in the first
instance via an informal hearing. The hearing officer upheld the
Authority’s revocation, which Gould appealed.88 The court held that the
informal hearing decision failed the third criterion of the test set forth
above because the decision did not bind the Authority.89
V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In Georgia Lottery Corporation v. Tabletop Media, LLC,90 the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly conducted an
independent review of the Georgia Lottery Corporation’s interpretation
of a statute.91 Tabletop Media, LLC, (Tabletop) developed a product
called “Ziosk,” a seven-inch Android-based touchscreen tabletop
computer tablet that it leases to restaurants. 92 “[T]he Georgia Lottery
Corporation (“GLC”) issued an executive order finding that the Ziosk
[tablets were] . . . coin-operated amusement machine[s] (“COAM”) and

83. Id.
84. Id. at 551, 826 S.E.2d at 111 (quoting S. View Cemetery Ass’n v. Hailey, 199 Ga.
478, 481, 34 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1945)).
85. Id. at 551, 826 S.E.2d at 112.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 558, 826 S.E.2d at 116.
88. Id. at 548, 826 S.E.2d at 109–10.
89. Id. at 555, 826 S.E.2d at 114–15.
90. 346 Ga. App. 498, 816 S.E.2d 438 (2018).
91. Id. at 498, 816 S.E.2d at 440.
92. Id. at 498, 816 S.E.2d at 439–40.
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[were therefore] subject to the licensing requirements and regulations
of GLC pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70.”93 Tabletop filed a petition for
review in the Fulton County Superior Court, and the superior court
reversed the GLC’s decision.94 On appeal, the GLC argued that the trial
court, among other things, failed to give deference to the GLC’s
interpretation of the relevant statute, O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70(b)(2)(A),95
and erred in concluding that Ziosk did not constitute a COAM subject to
GLC regulation.96 As to the first issue, the Georgia Court of Appeals
noted that O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70(b) provides the standard of review when
courts review GLC decisions, which is described as “‘essentially
identical’ to the standard of review provided in the Administrative
Procedure Act.”97 Accordingly, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined
that the superior court used the appropriate standard to review the
administrative decision.98 In quoting the rationale provided in Handel
v. Powell,99 the Georgia Supreme Court explained that:
“While judicial deference is afforded an agency’s interpretation of
statutes it is charged with enforcing or administering, the agency’s
interpretation is not binding on the courts, which have the ultimate
authority to construe statutes. It is the role of the judicial branch to
interpret the statutes enacted by the legislative branch and enforced
by the executive branch, and administrative rulings will be adopted
only when they conform to the meaning which the court deems
should properly be given. The judicial branch makes an independent
determination as to whether the interpretation of the administrative
agency correctly reflects the plain language of the statute and
comports with the legislative intent.”100

Accordingly, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the
superior court had applied the appropriate level of deference in
analyzing the GLC decision.101
The GLC additionally argued that the superior court erred by
concluding that the Ziosk tablet was not a COAM. 102 The Georgia Court
93. O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70 (2019); Georgia Lottery Co., 346 Ga. App. at 498, 816 S.E.2d
at 439.
94. Georgia Lottery Co., 346 Ga. App. at 498, 816 S.E.2d at 439–40.
95. O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70(b)(2)(A) (2019).
96. Georgia Lottery Co., 346 Ga. App. at 498, 816 S.E.2d at 440.
97. Id. at 500, 816 S.E.2d at 441 (citing O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h) (2019)).
98. Id. at 501, 816 S.E.2d at 441.
99. 284 Ga. 550, 670 S.E.2d 62 (2008).
100. Georgia Lottery Co., 346 Ga. App. at 501, 816 S.E.2d at 441–42 (quoting Handel,
284 Ga. at 553, 670 S.E.2d at 65).
101. Id. at 502, 816 S.E.2d at 442.

[1] ADMIN - BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/26/2019 10:53 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

11

of Appeals applied the language of O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70(b)(2)(A), which
defines a COAM as a “machine of any kind or character used by the
public to provide amusement or entertainment whose operation
requires the payment of or the insertion of a coin . . . the result of whose
operation depends in whole or in part upon the skill of the
player . . . .”103 In determining whether the superior court properly
applied the language of Section 50-27-70(b)(2)(A), the Georgia Court of
Appeals looked at the plain language of the statute and the parties’
agreement that the language was unambiguous. 104 Given these two
factors, the court concluded that because the Ziosk tablets can be
operated without requiring payment, the Ziosk tablet is not a COAM
according to the plain language of the statute. 105
In City of Guyton v. Barrow,106 the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed
a Georgia Court of Appeals decision holding that the antidegradation
rule required Environmental Protection Division (EPD) analysis for
nonpoint source discharges.107 EPD issued a permit to the City of
Guyton to build and operate a land application system (LAS) designed
to treat wastewater collected in the City’s sewer system. 108 The
plaintiff, Craig Barrow III, challenged the issuance of the permit on the
basis of violation of water quality standard because “[the permit] failed
to determine whether any resulting degradation of water quality in the
State waters surrounding the proposed LAS was necessary to
accommodate important economic or social development in the area.” 109
An A.L.J. rejected this argument, and Barrow appealed to the superior
court.110 The superior court affirmed the administrative ruling and, on
appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the
plain language “required EPD to perform the antidegradation analysis
for nonpoint source discharges, and that EPD’s internal guidelines to
the contrary did not warrant deference.”111
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider what level
of deference courts should afford EPD’s interpretation and whether the
Georgia Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the antidegradation

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 504, 816 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-27-70(b)(2)(A)).
Id. at 505, 816 S.E.2d at 444.
Id.
305 Ga. 799, 828 S.E.2d 366 (2019).
Id. at 800, 828 S.E.2d at 368.
Id. at 799, 828 S.E.2d at 367.
Id. at 799–800, 828 S.E.2d at 367.
Id. at 800, 828 S.E.2d at 367–68.
Id. at 800, 828 S.E.2d at 368.
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analysis was required for the City’s LAS. 112 The court declined to
answer the first question,113 claiming that because EPD is an agency,
the court is required to follow that agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation “unless ‘it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent’ with the
regulation.”114 The application of this principle requires a court to follow
agency interpretation so long as the interpretation is reasonable. 115
This principle can be overcome where the statutory interpretation is in
doubt or an ambiguity exists,116 but in this case the court concluded
that there was no doubt and no ambiguity. 117 Using the tools of
construction to make this determination, the court determined that
“[b]ecause the rule is not ambiguous, [the court did] not reach the
question of whether deference is appropriate in the case of true
ambiguity.”118
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Crittenden v. White,119 Lissia White, a British citizen and legal
permanent resident of the United States, was denied Medicaid benefits
in 2016 on the ground that she had not been a permanent legal resident
for five years. White appealed, and an A.L.J. affirmed the agency’s
decision. White sought final review, but her claim was denied by the
Commissioner of the Department of Community Health. White
petitioned the superior court for review, and the court reversed the final
decision, finding that the five-year period did not apply in this case
because White entered the United States prior to the legislation’s
enactment date.120
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals assessed the superior
court’s application of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act. 121 This
act states that the superior court may only reverse an agency decision
if:
[S]ubstantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because
the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 802, 828 S.E.2d at 369 (quoting Atlanta Journal & Const. v. Babush, 257
Ga. 790, 792, 364 S.E.2d 560, 562 (1988)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 804, 828 S.E.2d at 370.
118. Id.
119. 346 Ga. App. 179, 816 S.E.2d 308 (2018).
120. Id. at 179–80, 816 S.E.2d at 309–10.
121. Id. at 180, 816 S.E.2d at 310.
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(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 122
In light of this standard of review, the court found that the
Department of Community Health unlawfully withheld benefits in
violation of Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 123 According to that federal
statute, only continued physical presence is required in order to be
eligible for Medicaid.124 The statute required, in pertinent part, that
legal residents enter the United States before August 22, 1996, and be
continuously present in the United States until such time that they
obtain their qualified alien status.125 Because White entered prior to
August 22, 1996, and was continuously present until she obtained
qualified alien status, the A.L.J. made a determination on an unlawful
procedure.126 As such, White fell under the purview of Title IV and
qualified for Medicaid.127

122. Id. at 180–81, 816 S.E.2d at 310 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h)).
123. Id. at 184, 816 S.E.2d at 312 (citing Interim Guidance on Verification of
Citizenship, Qualified Alien Status and Eligibility Under Title IV of the Personal
Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,344 (Nov. 17,
1997) [hereinafter Interim Guidance]); see also Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
124. Crittenden, 346 Ga. App. at 182, 816 S.E.2d at 311.
125. Id. at 183, 816 S.E.2d at 311 (citing Interim Guidance, supra note 123, at 61,415).
126. Id. at 184–85, 816 S.E.2d at 312.
127. Id. at 185, 816 S.E.2d at 312.
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